Can nuclear put its BESS foot forward?

The Brexit British Energy Security Strategy is launched today, and it puts new nuclear power front and centre. 24GW of new nuclear by 2050, substantial new funding (despite none being available for energy efficiency) and an ambition to build one reactor a year instead of one a decade.

There are huge feasibility issues here – nuclear power stations suck in huge numbers of numbers of construction workers amidst an ‘ever growing skills gap’ in the industry. Small modular reactors (SMRs) are to form a ‘key part’ of the pipeline. But up until late last year there was no legal definition of an SMR and the UK regulatory approach had not even been decided. In November, Rolls Royce submitted an SMR for assessment but the process takes around four years.

But setting these and other issues (like the fact that nuclear power stations are potentially disastrous in conflicts as the invasion of Ukraine is showing) aside, what about the cost of new nuclear?

The contract for difference deal for Hinkley Point C sets a price of £89.50/MWh, roughly double the government’s own estimates of the generation costs of onshore wind and large scale solar PV, and well above that of offshore wind. Both government and industry argue that this is a ‘first-of-a-kind’ cost and that with a larger fleet using an established design, costs will come down to become competitive.

However, a more important development on costs is the government’s move to fund new nuclear using a regulated asset base (RAB) approach. The RAB approach has long been used to fund electricity and gas networks – companies borrow to build infrastructure and consumers have to pay a certain amount every year to cover these capital costs, with the amount they pay being regulated by Ofgem.

The big idea with the RAB approach is that it reduces risks for companies by sharing these with consumers. This includes construction risks, and this matters as there have been big construction cost overruns on recent European nuclear projects.  In theory the RAB approach should reduce how much companies pay to borrow – the ‘cost of capital’. Since nuclear is very, very capital intensive with relatively small running costs, the cost of electricity from nuclear is highly sensitive to the cost of capital.

There are questions about why a RAB approach should be taken with one kind of generation while not with others; as a 2019 National Infrastructure Commission report pointed out, this is an implicit subsidy for nuclear compared with other technologies, above and beyond any CfD FiT.

There are also dangers that consumers start paying upfront for the construction of planned plants that in the end are never built because demand is lower than expected or because other kinds of capacity grow more than expected. This has been the US experience where a RAB approach for nuclear has led to consumers paying billions of dollars for plants that were never completed.

Beyond this, there is a risk that institutional investors, to whom developers will turn for financing new nuclear plants, will not want to get involved. Institutional investors are under increasing pressure on environmental and social governance (ESG) and some are not convinced that nuclear makes the cut.

But there are also questions of how far a RAB approach will actually reduce costs. The government expects that compared with the CfD FiT approach for Hinkley C the RAB approach will reduce costs by £10/MWh. The best guide to this is how this approach has worked in the area where it has already been applied for years – i.e. energy networks. The short answer is that regulators have struggled to get value for money because of ‘asymmetric information’ – i.e. companies know more about real costs, including the costs of capital, than regulators do, and despite lots of efforts to stop them, often game the system to earn higher profits than they should. Networks are a low risk business, and companies in the industry should be earning relatively low, single-figure returns on equity. But the experience of the 2010s was that network companies were earning up to 12%, and an average 19% profit margin.

So even a RAB approach may not offer real value for money on nuclear. Ultimately, the big, rapid falls in the costs of renewables have come about because of competition. Nuclear power plants are too big and risky (even ‘small’ modular reactors are actually pretty big) to be built in any other way than through a negotiated process between states and a very limited number of large companies. By giving nuclear such a central role, the BESS may provide a long-term vision to help get off gas in electricity generation, but it is a risky and potentially costly one.

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Spending and borrowing plans

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As the parties begin to publish their spending plans, its good to see not only the bidding up of ambition on resources on measures to reduce emissions, but also proposals to meet the cost of these from public borrowing.

The Liberal Democrats are pledging to spend £15 billion over the life of the next Parliament on investing in the housing stock to reduce emissions. Labour meanwhile are promising to spend £60 billion via a National Transformation Fund on transforming housing , using a mix of public borrowing and private finance. However, Continue reading

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A series of fortunate events…?

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The children’s author Lemony Snicket named his highly successful series of books A Series of Unfortunate Events. This title drips with irony, since the awful and apparently endless troubles of the orphaned Baudelaire twins have nothing to do with chance, but instead are very much the result of an intentional campaign waged by the wicked Count Olaf in order to get his hands on their family fortune.

In this post I argue that a mirror image of this construction can be found in some of the recent boosterism about the UK’s record on climate policy, and especially the ease with which the first two carbon budgets have been met. Rather than a simple story about the success of policies adopted under the Climate Change Act (CCA), promoted as a model for the rest of the world, I would argue that what has actually happened is a more complex and nuanced tale, in which a degree of good luck has played a major part.

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British climate politics – this time it’s different (but the same)

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Starting about 15 years ago, Britain saw a wave of heightened concern about climate change. It emerged in the spring of 2004, peaked in late 2006 and by the early 2010s had largely dissipated.  But concern about climate change has made a dramatic comeback in 2019. This year has seen a ‘climate spring’ – the school strikes for climate, the net zero report by the Committee on Climate Change and above all the demonstrations by Extinction Rebellion have all pushed the issue way back the agenda. A climate emergency has been declared by multiple bodies and authorities, including Parliament. How far are things different this time round?

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The significance of Parliament’s Citizens Assembly on net zero

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This post first appeared on the IGov blog.

The announcement today from six House of Commons Select Committees that they are to hold a Citizens Assembly (CA) on how we might achieve a pathway to net zero emissions is a major step. The move is clearly inspired by (and made under pressure from) the upsurge of activism on climate change – school strikes, Extinction Rebellion protests, the resurgence of the Green New Deal and the declaration by numerous institutions, including Parliament, of a ‘climate emergency’ (as well as a bit of encouragement from IGov’s Dr Becky Willis).

I would argue that the Select Committees holding a CA is particularly important in the UK context. Continue reading

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What do Mark Carney’s recent troubles and climate policy have in common?

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This morning former Shadow Chancellor and Strictly star Ed Balls waded into the current controversy about the role of an independent Bank of England. Along with Gordon Brown, Balls was the man who pulled the rabbit of central bank independence out of the hat the day after the 1997 election that brought Labour to power. Today Balls argued that:

‘If in the end when things start to go wrong, everything is concentrated in the Bank of England only, that is politically dangerous for the Bank. So in order to protect independence, the Bank needs more political support and accountability’

Balls’ intervention comes after Theresa May’s criticism of quantitative easing in the Tory party conference speech in October, and then a series of more direct attacks by senior Tory politicians on Mark Carney, the Bank’s Governor, most recently by Jacob Rees-Mogg. There have also been attacks on the US’s Federal Bank by Donald Trump. Continue reading

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Energy competitiveness in the Budget – going for cheap and dirty, not lean and clean

Steel-MakingMuch of the discussion of today’s Budget will be about wins for pensioners and bingo players, but another winner was energy-intensive industry. Setting the background, the Budget text involved some fairly selective data and glided over a few inconvenient facts. Continue reading

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Response to Guy Newey on carbon pricing

Policy ExchangeGuy Newey, head of environment and energy at the centre-right think-tank Policy Exchange has written a critique of my post on the politics of carbon pricing. Just a few further thoughts in response: Continue reading

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The politics of carbon pricing

EU 2030 FrameworkThe anti-renewables bandwagon is rolling ever faster. This started some time ago, but has now started to bite on policy, as seen in the EU’s 2030 proposals which contain no binding renewables target. There is an emerging view, to be found especially amongst economists (including The Economist) and on the centre-right (as opposed to the hard right anti-all climate policy view) that the focus should shift away from renewables support and back towards carbon pricing. Carbon pricing, the argument goes, will deliver emissions reduction at least cost. The implication is that, because it will be much cheaper than renewables, it will be politically a lot more popular, or at least easier.

I see two reasons for thinking that it’s not as simple as it seems, and that putting all hope in carbon pricing and backing off from renewables policy may run into trouble. Continue reading

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More on the Anglo-German conundrum

Flags of Germany and Great BritainAt the conference of the British Institute of Energy Economists yesterday, one of the speakers (the conference was held under Chatham House Rules) poured scorn on German energy policy, pointing to the €200 billion that will be paid out in subsidies over the next 10 years to renewables, the offshore wind turbines kept going by diesel and the socialisation of costs incurred where developers face delays. Economic efficiency, he said, should be at the heart of energy policy, Germans have ignored this and have paid the price. By contrast, Continue reading

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