Comments for Political Climate

Comment on Populism and the rise of climate scepticism by Mike Childs

Mike Childs — Tue, 24 Apr 2012 15:47:37 +0000

Hello Matthew, not sure what your “strenuous efforts” have been with us (Friends of the Earth) to discuss whether a study should be carried out. We are very interested in this stuff so do drop me an e-mail and perhaps we could talk? Mike (Head of Science, Policy & Research at Friends of the Earth)

Comment on Why does the UK find it so hard to develop CCS? by Roy Tindle

Roy Tindle — Sun, 22 Apr 2012 20:09:57 +0000

There are several problems for CCS: the first is that the chemical processes that we can use to scrub relatively low concentrations from exhaust gases – most of the content remains nitrogen – require the expenditure of fairly large amounts of energy to then release to CO2. It’s not just the cost of installation but the considerable added cost of generation and, hence, the cost to the consumer.

The next problem is that CCS can be used to excuse more coal burning generation on the ‘promise’ of later CCS installation; a promise that could amount to inaction and yet more CO2 emissions.

The third is that CCS can be used as a disincentive for investment in renewable energy and, certainly, a disincentive for sound, long term governmental renewable policy. £1 – 2 billion spent on an, as yet, unproven technology is money that will not be invested in renewables.

The fourth is that we still have limited understanding of plate tectonics: geologically safe formations just don’t exist. We still are unable to forecast earthquakes. In the short term we may be able to use past oil and gas bearing formations and regard them as safe but what would we be leaving for future generations?

Finally, coal, like oil and uranium, are finite resources. Solar and gravitational energy are finite, too, but over periods that are all but unimaginable to us. Investing in coal burning is not sustainable, it is a short term solution that simply defers the long term solution to another generation.

Comment on Populism and the rise of climate scepticism by Alex macGillivray

Alex macGillivray — Mon, 16 Apr 2012 10:38:54 +0000

A positive strategy is to figure out the populist heartland for collective low carbon life. 350 and Transition Towns haven’t cracked this.

Comment on Populism and the rise of climate scepticism by Nick Comer-Calder

Nick Comer-Calder — Mon, 16 Apr 2012 08:42:28 +0000

All very relevant to the ongoing IPPR Media & Climate Change initiative which is looking at ways to engage mainstream media in new approaches to climate change coverage. Media ambivalence towards/boredom with
climate change has surely helped populist nay-sayers to gain ground. Bringing humour to bear is an idea to be pursued.

Comment on Populism and the rise of climate scepticism by Duncan Green

Duncan Green — Mon, 16 Apr 2012 06:21:16 +0000

Any lessons from Taggart about how previous populist movements have imploded? Might be some useful ideas in terms of accelerating the process for denialists

Comment on The politics of the sustainable state by John Magrath

John Magrath — Mon, 02 Apr 2012 11:44:38 +0000

The Norway case is fascinating and hopeful, but how far it can carry on – or evolve further – to be a 21st century state of the kind that’s needed, and how far that relates in any way to climate change, are uncertain given trends in fossil fuel extraction globally. Norway retains considerable domestic oil resources that it can continue to use progressively, but in doing so it has created in Statoil a multinational company keen to exploit oil elsewhere around the world, and like the UK, the Norwegian government does not “appear to be inclined to develop oil policies that might address concerns about climate change”. Those are issues raised by Andrew Cumbers in an esay “North Sea Oil, the State and development in the UK and Norway” in a new book “Flammable Societies, studies in the socio-economics of oil and gas” (McNeish and Logan, Pluto Press). Cumbers points out that Norway had an historical concept of the state that is (was?) more akin to the Asian developmental state than to a neoliberal one like the UK, and how it managed its oil revenues reflects the relative power of its trades unions asnd other social forces. But he says that even in Norway “a business-as-usual attitude of extracting oil and gas when and wherever possible, to contribute to state and corporate revenues, seems to be prevalent, with climate change policy happening somewhere else in the government jurisdiction”. He also says that the Norwegian model is “coming under increasing pressure from the very business interests that it has stimulated in the past”. Elsewhere in the book McNeish and Logan point out more explicitly how Staoil has become almost “a state within a state” and “is increasingly involved in questionable investments and dealings abroad”. All states, says Cumber, “face increasingly hard choices between prosecuting the interests of capital internationally and maintaining social cohesion and spatially balanced growth at home”.

Comment on A climate of populism? by Mark Jarmth

Mark Jarmth — Fri, 13 Jan 2012 21:51:06 +0000

Mead is clearly wrong about Jacksonian populism. Tea-partiers are not populists. Their agenda is grounded in the supply side rubric of right-wing economic elites.

I make the point in somewhat different terms in my first book, The Nazi Paradigm, where I describe American fascism as the product of the intense competition for political preeminence between the cultural and economic elite.

jarmuth@hotmail.com

Comment on Talks about talks by Matthew Lockwood

Matthew Lockwood — Thu, 15 Dec 2011 18:30:31 +0000

Hi Nick – thanks for visiting the blog and for the comment. I agree the Durban Platform gives a renewed chance for a multilateral process, which is good news, although I don’t agree that the counterfactual would necessarily have meant a lock in to 4C.
Also appreciate that negotiation is an art and the politics of the moment count, but as we know from previous examples, the moment has to be sold back home, long after it has ended. Incentive structures don’t disappear. And that’s where I think Barrett is still relevant, regardless of the number or size of actors. As I see it, the most fundamental point he makes is that a successful treaty needs first to create a net gain. On climate, the gains are weak, which is why it has been so difficult so far. I don’t see that has changed much since 1997, and don’t see it changing much by 2015, except, as I argued, maybe for China.

Comment on Talks about talks by Nick Mabey

Nick Mabey — Wed, 14 Dec 2011 16:19:34 +0000

Matthew, the reason why US and China agreed to the strengthened Durban package with only legally binding options – when they had in plenary both supported the package with a non- legally binding option – was because of the pressure supplied by the EU, AOSIS, LDCs and progressive Latin American countries in the room. It was a good example of immediate politics of the moment outweighing “structural factors” to push people further than they wanted to go. It could not have happened in a G20 type setting where the most vulnerable countries are excluded and thus is one of the reasons we need to keep climate deals in a UN setting. Of course, what the conclusion of the talks will be in 2015 nobody knows – not least because the Chinese leadership which will take that decision are not in place. However, the outcome will have little to do with Barrett’s game theory analysis which is based on lots of similar small countries negotiating not a core agreement consisting of a few big countries with a long tail of small ones.

What many commentators have failed to point out was that if Durban had failed then we would be locked into over 4C and the EU would have been finished as a climate leader. We came very close to that outcome on Sunday night. I do not think we would have recovered from that set back – there was no political energy left in the EUs tank. Now we have an opportunity to build the politics of a 2C agreement in 2015. Who knows if we will succeed but at least we now have a chance! The priorities for the next four years are action on the ground to build examples of a low carbon economy and mobilization of political will and cooperation.

Nick Mabey E3G

Comment on The renewable energy backlash – Part 2 by Eliot Whittington

Eliot Whittington — Fri, 02 Dec 2011 13:44:26 +0000

Very interesting. I’m sort of wondering how to square a sensible proposal based on these ideas with the car crash that is the EU ETS. At the moment I’m hearing a lot of unhappiness with how renewables, efficiency, nation state policies obscure a straightforward policy based on carbon price regime. Now you can construct an argument for some policies for clear market failures (e.g. around innovation or cost-effective efficiency measures), which is where we are today in the EU, but the political economy you guys talk about leads you into problems I think. The mindset I describe implies the carbon price will do the heavy lifting & other policies will pick up missing pieces of the puzzle. I suspect the reality is that the carbon price will never be politically palatable at levels that will drive the real changes required, so other policies need to do much more – which then exposes them to further backlash.

The further complicating factor is the overlapping governance of the EU & its member states. Political accountability for keeping the lights on really sits at the national level, so EU-wide policies will always struggle to deliver the coherence, clarity & stability business actors want.